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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Plaintiff-appellant is Michael C. Posner, referred to herein as "Posner." 
2. Defendant-appellee Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc., referred to herein 
as "Equity Title," was a defendant below. The district court granted summary judgment 
to Equity Title on May 23, 2005, which Posner appealed. 
3. Defendant Independence Title Insurance Agency, referred to herein as 
"Independence Title," was a defendant below. The district court granted summary 
judgment to Independence Title in the same ruling that also granted summary judgment 
to Equity Title. Posner did not appeal the grant of summary judgment to Independence 
Title, and it is not a party to this appeal. 
4. Defendant-appellee NRT, Inc. dba Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, 
referred to herein as "Coldwell Banker," was named as a defendant below in Posner's 
First Amended Complaint, The district court granted Coldwell Banker's motion for 
summary judgment against Posner, onlNovember 12, 2008, which Posner appealed. 
Note: Posner's appellate brief (at page i) incorrectly states that Coldwell Banker 
is not a party to this appeal. In this appellee brief, Equity Title addresses only Posner's 
appeal of the grant of summary judgment in Equity Title's favor. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme t 'oun has original jurisdiction <>] \hu mailer under TT?ah C I; 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Equity 1 itle is satisfied w ith Posner ' s statement * . tnc issues presented for review 
(a s related to Eqi lity • I i t le), and Posner ' s sf nterrnT• * j ndard of review U>r those 
issues. 
S T A T E M E N T Q F T H E C A S E 
l.ijuiis hi! I. iafisdoi! uuli P o s i n i \ Nlah.'nu.-nl i llu- i «IM i.r. H*Li(at ni» fquiiy 
Title), including Posner's description of the course of proceedings below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
in inn , i'liiMii.i ,i i'luiii idii h.'SHicm listed i i 'nilc i n n parcel'" ol p m p c r h In1 
owned in Pa rk City, Utah. R. 326. I lis real estate agent in Park City was Kandis 
Christoffersen ^ r defendant Coldwel l Bankei U T- T ' 200". Posner began 
negotiations i nn pa iaT m .Miaciian v. J-I * X 
which resulted in the exeeution of a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "REPC") between 
~ aer and Strachan. R. 287-98. 
.-;iauiau ..-aisL.
 t ....t.M . >> • ,*^. . :-., pail ol (lie 
n e e i io in a dim! r i^ 'auU- uu o o n o w i n g die remainder from Posner . R. 
• '-i A d d e n d u m N o 4 t( > the R E P C requires- Strachan t< >f n c >vide a '"Surety B o n d " for the 
seller f inancing. K. 29 I In; REPC does no t specify w h o wouui r ^ u e i*v oonu does not 
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impose any eligibility requirements on the bond provider, nor does it state any other 
requirement for the bond. R. 287-98. The REPC does not require Posner's personal 
approval of the surety bond. Id. 
The transaction was closed through a "split closing," with Equity Title acting as 
Posner's escrow agent, and defendant Independence Title, which is not a party to this 
appeal, acting as Strachan's escrow agent. R. 327. On or about August 23, 2002, Posner 
signed closing documents, but Strachan was not able to close the transaction at that time, 
and had not yet supplied a bond agreement. Id. After signing the closing documents, on 
August 23, 2002, Posner returned to his home in Florida. Id. 
In Posner's absence, he delegated to his agent, Ms. Christoffersen, responsibilities 
relating to closing the transaction and the surety bond. R. 285-86. Specifically, in 
response to his own attorney's question regarding Ms. Christoffersen's "role at closing," 
Posner testified in deposition: 
The only reason Kandis was at the closing was to get her 
commission. And my contact with her as being I guess my 
agent was to make sure that it [the subject transaction] closed. 
And she was the one that was negotiating back and forth 
with the contract as far as making sure that we had a surety 
bond and how much it was and everything else. 
R. 286 (emphasis added). 
On or about August 28, 2002, Strachan supplied Independence Title with the 
documents necessary to close Strachan's side of the transaction, including a six-page 
document entitled "Financial Guarantee," issued by American Natural Resources 
Corporation. R. 21, 317-22. Pursuant to the Financial Guarantee, American Natural 
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Resources Corporation guaranteed payment of Strachan's loan from Posner in the event 
Strachan defaulted on the seller financing. R. 317-22. On the same day, August 28, 
2002, Independence Title delivered the Financial Guarantee and the other closing 
documents to Helen Smith at Equity Title. R. 310. Ms. Smith faxed the Financial 
Guarantee to Ms. Christoffersen, who acknowledged receipt thereof in a telephone 
conversation with Ms. Smith on August 28, 2002. R. 302-03, 312, 314. 
On August 30, 2002, Ms. Christoffersen told Ms. Smith that she had spoken with 
Posner, and that Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee, and that Posner had 
instructed her to have Ms. Smith complete the closing. R. 314 (Smith Depo.), 306 
(Christoffersen Depo.). In his First Amended Complaint at f 25, Posner expressly admits 
that ". . . Ms. Christoffersen informed Ms. Smith that Mr. Posner had approved the 
Financial Guarantee written for the amount of $260,000 and stated that Equity could 
proceed with the closing." R. 328-29 (emphasis added). 
Consistent with Posner's instructions communicated through Ms. Christoffersen, 
Equity Title closed the transaction on August 30, 2002 with the Financial Guarantee in 
place. R. 308, 329. After the closing, Strachan failed to make any payments to Posner. 
R. 329. Despite demand from Posner, American Natural Resources Corporation failed to 
make good on the Financial Guarantee. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court's summary judgment in favor of Equity Title should be affirmed 
because Posner's instructions to Equity Title, conveyed through his agent, Ms. 
Christoffersen, are binding upon Posner. It is undisputed and expressly admitted by 
4810-7541-0178.1 3 
Posner that Posner's agent, Ms. Christoffersen, informed Equity Title that Posner had 
approved the Financial Guarantee and specifically instructed Equity Title that it should 
close the transaction. Ms. Christoffersen's statements to Equity Title in this regard were 
within the scope of her actual and/or apparent authority, and are binding upon Posner. 
Equity Title cannot be liable for a breach of duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to Posner 
for following the specific instructions of his agent. With respect to Posner's fiduciary 
duty argument, Posner is incorrect in asserting that the REPC was materially changed 
because the guarantee contract was called "Financial Guarantee" rather than "Surety 
Bond," and had a face amount of $260,000 rather than $263,900. These differences are 
immaterial as a matter of law. If the Financial Guarantee had been entitled "Surety 
Bond," Posner would be in no different position than he is today. A surety bond is 
simply a performance bond, which is precisely what the Financial Guarantee purports to 
be. The cause of Posner's loss was not the title of the document; it was the selection of 
the guarantor and that guarantor's failure to make good on its promise to make payment 
if Strachan failed to do so, which is a matter that did not involve Equity Title. 
Likewise, the $3,900 difference between the face amount of the Financial 
Guarantee and Posner's belated revision to Addendum No. 9 to the REPC is also 
immaterial. Posner admitted that neither Strachan nor the guarantor, American Natural 
Resources Corporation, ever made a single payment to Posner. R. 329. Thus, there is no 
causal connection between the guarantor's default and the fact that the Financial 
Guarantee had a face amount of $260,000 rather than $263,900. Moreover, Posner 
changed Addendum No. 9 to the REPC, crossing out the figure $260,000 and 
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interlineating the figure $263,900, after Strachan had closed his side of the transaction 
and after American Natural Resources had executed the Financial Guarantee for 
$260,000. R. 411, 317-22; Brief of Appellant at 7. 
In any event, the issues concerning the title "Financial Guaranty" versus "Surety 
Bond" and the contract amount of $260,000 versus $263,000 are moot because Posner's 
agent expressly instructed Equity Title that Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee 
and that Equity Title should close the transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE POSNER IS 
BOUND BY HIS AGENT'S INSTRUCTION TO EQUITY TITLE THAT 
POSNER HAD APPROVED THE FINANCIAL GUARANTEE AND THAT 
EQUITY TITLE SHOULD CLOSE THE TRANSACTION, 
The district court properly granted summary judgment in Equity Title's favor 
because Posner's agent told Equity Title that Posner had approved the Financial 
Guarantee, and told Equity Title to proceed with the closing. Thus, Equity Title's actions 
in closing the transaction with the Financial Guaranty in place were taken on the express 
consent, approval and instruction of Posner's agent. Ms. Christoffersen's statements to 
Equity Title were within the scope of her actual and/or apparent authority to act in 
Posner's behalf, and therefore are binding against Posner. 
Posner's attempt to create factual issues relating telephone records, facsimiles and 
Posner's approval of the Financial Guaranty are of no avail because it is undisputed and 
expressly admitted by Posner that, "Ms. Christoffersen informed Ms. Smith that Mr. 
Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee written for the amount of $260,000 and 
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stated that Equity could proceed with the closing" R. 328-29 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, Posner made this admission in his First Amended Complaint, which he 
filed on March 29, 2005 (R. 323-36), after he had completed discovery related to Equity 
Title, and after Equity Title filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Both Equity Title's 
employee, Helen Smith, and Posner5 s agent, Kandis Christoffersen, testified that, on 
August 30, 2002, Ms. Christoffersen told Ms. Smith that she had spoken with Posner, and 
that Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee, and that Posner had instructed her to 
have Ms. Smith complete the closing. R. 314 (Smith Depo.), 306 (Christoffersen Depo.). 
A. Posner Is Bound by the Statements of His Agent to Equity Title 
Regarding His Approval of the Financial Guarantee and Instruction to 
Proceed with the Closing. 
Ms. Christoffersen was Posner's agent with respect to the subject transaction, and 
had Posner's actual and/or apparent authority to accept the Financial Guarantee supplied 
by Strachan and to instruct Equity Title to proceed with the closing of the transaction. 
Accordingly, Posner is bound by the representations and instructions Christoffersen 
conveyed to Equity Title. See Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 
605-606 (Utah 1978) ("It is fundamental that where one authorized another to act for him 
and for his intended benefit that, insofar as the latter is doing acts within the scope of the 
authority given, or acts reasonably calculated to further that purpose, the principal so 
authorizing is deemed to be performing those acts himself."). 
"Actual authority can be either express or implied." Distort v. EnviroPak Med. 
Products, Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah App. 1995). In Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court explained that: 
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Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express and 
implied authority. Express authority exists whenever the 
principal directly states that its agent has the authority to 
perform a particular act on the principal's behalf Implied 
authority, on the other hand, embraces authority to do those 
acts which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and 
proper to accomplish or perform, the main authority expressly 
delegated to the agent. 
Zions First Natl Bank v. ClarkClinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988). 
In contrast to actual authority, "[a] finding of apparent authority requires that the 
acts or conduct of the principal, [Posner], creates an appearance which causes a third 
party, [Equity Title], to reasonably believe that a second party, [Ms. Christoffersen], has 
authority to act on the principal's behalf." Distort, 893 P.2d at 1076. "Basic agency law 
dictates that a principal is bound by the acts of an agent clothed with apparent authority." 
Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15 (Utah App. 1995). See also Watson v. 
Tom Growney Equip., Inc., 721 P.2d 1302, 1304 (N.M. 1986) (seller's agent who told 
buyer that approval had been granted for sale of backhoe and who had apparent authority 
to make representation bound seller to contract with buyer); Au v. Au, 626 P.2d 173, 178 
(Haw. 1981) ("[A]n owner is responsible for the representations of his agent made within 
the scope of his agent's selling authority."). 
B. Ms. Christoffersen Acted Within the Scope of the Actual and/or 
Apparent Authority Granted to Her by Posner. 
The district court correctly found that Ms. Christoffersen was acting within the 
scope of her actual implied and/or apparent authority when she communicated to Equity 
Title that Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee and that he had instructed that 
Equity Title should proceed with the closing. R. 619-24. The undisputed facts in the 
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Record below confirm that Ms. Christoffersen had actual and/or apparent authority over 
all aspects of the closing, including determinations regarding the adequacy of "surety 
bond." Posner admitted in his First Amended Complaint that Ms. Christoffersen was his 
agent for this transaction. R. 326, at % 13. The Real Estate Purchase Contract identifies 
Ms. Christoffersen as Posner's agent in the transaction. R. 288. Posner admitted under 
oath that Christoffersen was his agent with specific authority over the closing and the 
terms of the "surety bond": 
Q. Can you just elaborate on what your — what her [Ms. 
Christoffersen's] role at closing was? Was there an agreement 
in place that she would be contacted? 
A. The only reason Kandis was at the closing was to get 
her commission. And my contact with her as being I guess 
my agent was to make sure that it closed. And she was the 
one that was negotiating back and forth with the contract as 
far as making sure that we had a surety bond and how much 
it was and everything else. 
R. 285-86 (emphasis added). Ms. Christoffersen also testified that she was Posner's 
agent. R. 300-01. Ms. Smith also testified that she understood Ms. Christoffersen to be 
Posner's agent relating to issues beyond merely listing the properties for sale. R. 316; see 
alsoR. 312-14. 
When Posner was confronted with the above-cited testimony in Equity Title's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, he responded by asserting that he had hired Ms. 
Christoffersen for the limited purpose of listing his property, but not to act as his agent at 
the closing. R. 462, 465, 468. He also submitted an affidavit to that effect, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was substantively inconsistent with his prior deposition 
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testimony. R. 481-84. Posner's affidavit contains the following statements that are both 
inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony and are internally inconsistent: 
2) I retained Kandis Christoffersen as my real estate 
agent at Colwell Banker to assist in locating a buyer and in 
preparing the Real Estate Purchase Contract for the sale. 
3) I did not request that Kandis Christoffersen attend or 
participate in my closing at Equity on August 3 0 t h . . . . 
10) I directed both Kandis Christoffersen and Helen Smith 
to make sure that the buyer supplied a "surety bond" at 
closing. 
11) In making this instruction, I expected both Kandis 
Christoffersen and Helen Smith to act on my behalf in a 
manner consistent with the fiduciary level of duty that real 
estate agents and escrow agents owe respectively to their 
principal and to each party to the escrow agreement. This 
included the expectation that, if Ms. Christoffersen or Ms. 
Smith had any doubts or questions as the legitimacy of the 
buyer's surety bond, they would notify me of the problem. . . . 
12) I never authorized Kandis Christoffesen [sic] to act as 
my agent at my closing, nor did I ever take any steps to give 
her apparent authority to act in my behalf. 
R. 481-83 (emphasis original). 
Thus, Posner testified in deposition that he authorized Ms. Christoffersen "to make 
sure that [the transaction] closed'5 (R. 286), and that Ms. Christoffersen "was one that was 
negotiating back and forth with the contract as far as making sure that we had a surety 
bond and how much it was and everything else." R. 286. He also testified in his affidavit 
that he expected Ms. Christoffersen to determine whether she "had any doubts or 
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questions as the legitimacy of the buyer's surety bond" (R. 483), evidencing his 
delegation to her of a continuing role and his grant of discretion to her regarding the 
matter. 
Notwithstanding these clear admissions, Posner, citing the affidavit he submitted 
after his deposition, states in his Brief of Appellant at 20 that "he expressly authorized 
Christoffersen to help find a buyer for his land and nothing more." (Emphasis added.) 
Posner apparently believes that he can create a genuine issue of material fact simply by 
offering inconsistent testimony. The truth, however, is not like "a nose of wax, which 
may be turned and twisted in any direction.'5 See White v. Dunbar\ 119 U.S. 47, 51 
(1886). Posner's claim that he limited the scope of Ms. Christoffersen's agency to the 
sole function of finding him a buyer is belied by his own prior deposition testimony 
quoted above. 
Furthermore, it is well recognized that, "when a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue 
of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an 
explanation of the discrepancy." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
See also Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (general rule in Utah is 
that affiant my not raise issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his 
deposition unless he provides an explanation). 
In summary, Ms. Christoffersen's instruction to Equity Title that Posner had 
approved the Financial Guarantee and that Equity Title should go forward with the 
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closing was well within the scope of the express authority Posner had granted to her, and 
in any event was certainly within the authority implicit to the main authority he had 
granted. Posner identified Ms. Christoffersen as his real estate agent in a writing signed 
by him, the REPC. R. 288. He also identified Ms. Christoffersen as his real estate agent 
in his Amended Complaint. R. 326. After Ms. Christoffersen found a buyer for Posner, 
her agency continued through the closing of the transaction and encompassed details 
relating to approval of the "surety bond." Specifically, Posner authorized Ms. 
Christoffersen to "negotiate[e] back and forth with the contract as far as making sure 
that we had a surety bond and how much it was and everything else?" R. 286 (emphasis 
added). He also authorized her to determine if she "had any doubts or questions as the 
legitimacy of the buyer's surety bond . . . ." R. 483. He further authorized her "to make 
sure that [the transaction] closed.55 R. 286. Thus, Ms. Christoffersen had express 
authority because her principal, Posner, directly stated that she had his authority to 
perform the particular acts at issue in this case on his behalf. See Zions First Nat'I Bank, 
762P.2datl095. 
In the alternative, Ms. Christoffersen had implied authority to perform the acts at 
issue because those acts were "incidental to, or [were] necessary, usual, and proper to 
Although the district court ruled that Ms. Christoffersen was acting within the scope of 
her "actual implied and/or apparent authority when she communicated plaintiffs 
approval of the Financial Guarantee55 (R. 620), the record on appeal also supports 
affirmation of the summary judgment order on the ground that Ms. Christoffersen was 
acting within the scope of her actual express authority. See Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 
928 P.2d. 384, 386 (Utah 1996) (appellate court may affirm summary judgment order on 
any ground appearing in the record, whether relied upon by the district court or not). 
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accomplish or perform, the main authority expressly delegated to [her]. Id. Posner's acts 
and conduct created an appearance which caused Equity Title to reasonably believe that 
Ms. Christoffersen had authority to act on Posner's behalf. The indicia of agency with 
which Posner clothed Ms. Christoffersen as his agent included his acts of identifying her 
as his listing agent on the REPC (R. 288), using her to negotiate the purchase contract (R. 
286), returning to Florida before the closing while leaving Ms. Christoffersen to handle 
the details of transaction leading up to and including the closing (including, at Posner's 
instruction, her communications with Equity Title regarding those details) (R. 327-28), 
delegating to Ms. Christoffersen the responsibilities of making sure that the transaction 
closed (R. 286) and verifying that the buyer supplied a surety bond in the correct amount 
(id). 
Ms. Christoffersen's statements and instructions to Equity Title regarding Posner's 
approval of the Financial Guarantee and instruction to close the transaction were fully 
consistent with her apparent authority. See Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 
15 (Utah App. 1995). Posner's conduct clothed Christoffersen with apparent authority in 
a manner analogous to, and well beyond, the principal's acts in Horrocks (allowing agent 
to travel in car bearing principal's insignia and cashing check which agent obtained from 
plaintiff). Furthermore, and "[p]erhaps most importantly, [Mr. Posner] failed to give 
[Equity Title] notice of any limitations on [Ms. Christoffersen's] authority." Horrocks, 
892 P.2d at 16. 
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Accordingly, Ms. Christoffersen's statements to Equity Title regarding the 
Financial Guarantee and the closing were within the scope of her actual (either express or 
implied or both) and/or apparent authority, and are binding upon Posner. 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT EQUITY TITLE 
DID NOT BREACH ANY DUTY OWED TO POSNER WHEN EQUITY 
TITLE FOLLOWED THE DIRECTIONS GIVEN BY POSNER'S AGENT. 
Posner correctly states that it is the duty of the escrow agent (Equity Title) to 
follow the instructions of its principal (Posner). Brief of Appellant at 25. It is axiomatic, 
therefore, that following such instructions, as Equity Title did in this case, cannot be a 
breach of Equity Title's duty. The district court's order granting summary judgment in 
Equity Title's favor was proper and should be affirmed. 
Posner erroneously argues that Equity Title breached fiduciary duties by closing 
the subject transaction that, "in both name and amount, did not match the specific 
requirements of the REPC terms." With respect to the title of the guarantee contract, 
Posner Is incorrect in asserting that the REPC was materially changed because the 
contract was called "Financial Guarantee" rather than "Surety Bond." This difference is 
immaterial. If the Financial Guarantee had been entitled "Surety Bond," Posner would be 
in no different position than he is today. 
Posner has offered no authority or even argument concerning any difference that 
would have resulted from entitling the contract "Surety Bond" versus "Financial 
Guaranty." Indeed, a surety bond is simply a performance bond, which is precisely what 
the Financial Guarantee purports to be. "Suretyship is a contractual relationship, 
synonymous with guaranty, in which one party [here, American Natural Resources 
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Corporation] promises to be answerable for the debt, default or miscarriage of another 
[here, Strachan]." E. Gallagher, The Law of Suretyship at 81 (2d ed. 2000). See also L. 
Moelmann & J. Harris, The Law of Performance Bonds at 8-9 (1999) (contractor's surety 
bonds secure performance of duty secured by the bond; other bond products which also 
secure performance by bonds include "Financial Guaranty Bonds," which "secure the 
payment of financial obligations, typically, promissory notes."). 
The cause of Posner's loss was not the title of the contract; it was the selection of 
the guarantor, American Natural Resources Corporation, which failed to make good on 
its promise to make payment to Posner if Strachan failed to do so—which had nothing 
whatsoever to do with Equity Title. 
Likewise, the $3,900 difference between the face amount of the Financial 
Guarantee and Posner's belated revision to Addendum No. 9 to the REPC is also 
immaterial. Posner admitted that neither Strachan nor American Natural Resources 
Corporation, ever made a single payment to Posner. R. 329. Thus, there is no causal 
connection between the guarantor's default and the fact that the Financial Guarantee had 
a face amount of $260,000 rather than $263,900. Moreover, Posner changed Addendum 
No. 9 to the REPC, crossing out the figure $260,000 and interlineating the figure 
$263,900, after Strachan had closed his side of the transaction and after American 
Natural Resources had executed the Financial Guarantee for $260,000. R. 411, 317-22; 
Brief of Appellant at 7. 
Accordingly, Posner failed to prove any breach of fiduciary duty by Equity Title, 
and the district court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Posner's agent, Kandis Christoffersen, was acting within the scope of her actual 
and/or apparent authority when she told Equity Title that Posner had approved the 
Financial Guarantee and instructed Equity Title to close the transaction. Therefore, her 
instructions are binding upon Posner, and Equity Title cannot be held liable for breach of 
any duty to Posner for following those instructions. 
Accordingly, Equity Title respectfully requests that the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in Equity Title's favor be affirmed. 
DATED this <^ day of June, 2009? 
DAVID M. BENNION 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Robert Pearson dba Robert 
Pearson Construction 
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